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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW 
Donald J. Simon* 
The Watergate scandal of the early seventies spawned a number of 
reforms in the operation of the federal government and in the policing 
of its highest officials. Strict regulations, for instance, were imposed 
on the role of money in political campaigns, 1 ethics codes were enacted 
in the two houses of Congress, 2 and government agencies were directed 
to conduct their business in public. 3 In addition, a new system was 
established to investigate and prosecute misconduct by high govern-
ment officials. This system - involving the appointment of temporary 
special prosecutors independent of the normal prosecutorial power in 
the Justice Department4 - was designed to ensure that those who con-
trol the law can also be made subject to it. 
Five years after its passage, the special prosecutor law still comes 
under frequent attack. The Reagan Administration has been one of 
the foremost critics of the law, charging that it is unnecessary, unfair, 
and expensive. 5 Congress has recently considered these and other 
criticisms of the law, and enacted some revisions to it, although the 
basic special prosecutor mechanism has been left substantially intact. 6 
* Associate, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Guido, -Washington, D.C. Former Associate General 
Counsel, Common Cause, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1975, J.D., 1978, Harvard University. The 
author was co-counsel for Common Cause as amicus curiae in Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 
(D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981), a case challenging the constitutionality of the special pros-
ecutor law. See infra notes 7, 75-76, 92. 
I. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U .S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 
1981)); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 
2. See S. Doc. No. 97-1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-73 (1981) (Senate Standing Rules 34-42); 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 26 (1982) (Rule 43, 
House Code of Official Conduct). 
3. See Government in the Sunshine Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (Supp. IV 1980). 
4. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. Supp. V 1981). 
5. See Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Management of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) (letter of May 21, 1981 from Attorney General William French Smith 
to Sen. William Cohen) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings]; id. at 92 (testimony of Associate 
Attorney General Rudolph W. Giuliani). 
6. See The Ethics in Government Act, 1982 amendments, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). The special prosecutor law as enacted in 1978 contained an automatic termination, or 
"sunset" provision, which provided that the law would expire on October 26, 1983, five years 
45 
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Not the least of the criticisms - made by both the Administration 
and others - is that the special prosecutor law is unconstitutional. 
The constitutionality of the law has never been adjudicated by a court, 
although one case directly raised the issue. 7 Because of the importance 
of the law, and the novelty of the constitutional questions it raises, 
it is virtually certain that the courts will soon be presented with another 
direct challenge to it. 8 
This Article explores the constitutional questions posed by the special 
prosecutor law and concludes that the law is constitutional. Part I ex-
amines the political setting that gave rise to the special prosecutor pro-
visions and discusses the intent of the drafters. Part II explains the 
precise manner in which the provisions operate and surveys the recent 
experience under the law. Finally, part III evaluates the constitutional 
objections raised by critics of the legislation. 
I. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW 
The special prosecutor law is part of the Ethics in. Government Act 
of 1978 (the Ethics Act),9 a comprehensive congressional effort to 
safeguard the integrity of the governmental process. That legislation 
represented a landmark effort to instill public copfidence in the fair 
and ethical behavior of public officials. 10 
after its enactment, unless affirmatively re-enacted by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (Supp. 
IV 1980). The recent amendments passed by Congress did re-enact the Jaw for an additional 
five year period, in addition to making certain revisions described below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 35-68. Notwithstanding his Administration's stated opposition to the special pro-
secutor concept, President Reagan signed into law the 1982 amendments, including the five year 
extension of the law. 
7. The constitutionality of the Jaw was challenged by Timothy Kraft, former assistant to 
President Carter. Mr. Kraft filed a civil action against a special prosecutor who was conducting 
an investigation into allegations of drug use by Mr. Kraft. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 
(D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981). The constitutional issues raised were not decided by the 
court because the civil action was dropped after the special prosecutor concluded his investiga-
tion without bringing charges. See infra notes 75-76, 92 and accompanying text. 
8. Indeed, a Senate Subcommittee considering revisions to the Act took critical note of the 
Reagan Administration's statements doubting the constitutionality of the law. The Subcommit-
tee noted that "[b)ecause of the reservations expressed by the Attorney General, the Subcommit-
tee believes that it is virtually inevitable that the next subject of a special prosecutor investigation 
will move to enjoin the special prosecutor on grounds that the provisions are unconstitutional." 
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF THE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENTAL AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR PROVISIONS OF 
THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978, at 21 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as SUB-
COMMITTEE REPORT 1981). The Subcommittee also stated that the Attorney General's position 
"will invite an immediate challenge to the Act the next time that it is invoked." Id. at I. 
9. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. 
(Supp. IV 1980)). The special prosecutor provisions are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
I 0. In addition to the special prosecutor provisions, the Ethics Act imposed financial disclosure 
requirements on officials in the legislative branch, 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (Supp. IV 1980); the 
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The Ethics Act was the product of the Watergate scandals, which 
generated the most serious crisis of public confidence in government 
in modern American history. Yet, notwithstanding the sense of urgen-
cy with which Congress and the public sought ways to ensure that a 
similar crisis could be averted in the future, the special prosecutor pro-
visions of the Ethics Act evolved through a process of careful congres-
sional consideration extending over several years. 11 The result represents --
a carefully conceived, pragmatic solution to specific problems exposed 
by Watergate. 
The Senate Watergate investigation that began in the fall of 1972 
and culminated in President Nixon's resignation nearly two years later 
exposed not only gross misconduct by high government officials, but 
also impropriety and favoritism in the Justice Department's investigation 
of that misconduct. 12 In several important ways, the exposure of these 
wrongdoings demonstrated the need for some special arrangement to 
deal with the problem of favoritism in the prosecution of high govern-
ment officials. 
First, the Watergate scandals underscored the inherent conflict of 
interest created whenever officials in the Department of Justice attempt 
to investigate or prosecute high-ranking members of the executive 
branch. At bottom, the problem lies in the inevitable conflicts that 
compromise, or appear to compromise, efforts by the Justice Depart-
ment to conduct a fair ~nd impartial investigation of the President 
and his closest advisers. The conflicts stem from the divided loyalties 
inherent in the office of the Attorney General. On the one hand, the 
Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice and the 
executive branch, 5 U.S.C. app.I §§ 201-211 (1976); and the judicial branch, 28 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 301-309 (Supp. IV 1980). The bill established an Office of Government Ethics to monitor 
and enforce these disclosure requirements. 5 U.S.C. app.l §§ 401-405 (Supp. IV 1980). The legisla-
tion also enacted so-called "revolving door" provisions governing post-employment conflicts of 
interest, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. IV 1980), and established an office of Senate Legal Counsel. 
2 U.S.C. § 288 (Supp. Ill 1979). 
·ll. See generally Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
93d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Removing Politics From the Administration of Justice: Hearings 
on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2803); Watergate 
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 Before the Senate 
_Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975-1976); Provision for Special 
Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R. 14476 et al., Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Special Prosecutor Legislation: 
Hearings on H.R. 2835 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977: 
Hearings on S. 555 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977). 
12. See S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-213 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 
981); see also infra text accompanying notes 15-34. See generally Presidential Campaign Ac-
tivities of 1972: Hearings on Watergate and Related Activities Before the Senate Select Comm. 
on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
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nation's chief law enforcer. On the other hand, he is a political ap-
pointee and the primary legal adviser to the President. These two roles 
come into direct and often irreconcilable conflict in those cases where 
it is the President or his close aides against whom the law must be 
enforced. As former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox 
testified before the Senate, "The pressures, the tensions of divided loyal-
ty are too much for any man, and as honorable and conscientious as 
any individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy about 
the vigor and thoroughness with which the investigation was pursued. 
Some outside person is absolutely essential." 13 Former U.S. Attorney 
Whitney North Seymour succinctly stated the same sentiment in his 
Senate testimony, noting that, "loyalty to the political interests of the 
administration may often require disloyalty to the goal of impartial 
justice." 14 
Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on presidential Cam-
paign Activities (the Senate Watergate Committee) revealed ample 
evidence of such conflicts. It was shown, for instance, that throughout 
the summer of 1972, and continuing until the spring of 1973, Henry 
Petersen, chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, served 
as a "conduit for a constant flow of information from the grand jury 
and the prosecutors" to both presidential counsel John Dean and to 
the President. 1 s Dean testified that Petersen informed him of the 
witnesses that would be called before the grand jury, and what they 
would be asked. 16 According to Dean, Petersen passed on the informa-
tion because he was "a soldier." 11 As Dean phrased it, "[Petersen] 
believed in you [the President] and he believes in this Administration. 
This Administration made him. I don't think he ha[s] done anything 
improper, but he did make sure that the investigation was narrowed 
down ... which was a break for us." 18 On several occasions Petersen 
even gave the President tactical advice as to ''the posture the White 
House should strike during the investigation." 19 
In April of 1973, Attorney General Kleindienst removed himself from 
the Watergate case and Petersen assumed full responsibility for the 
investigation. 20 Throughout April, Petersen continued to confer regularly 
with the targets of his investigation. 21 The knowledge he imparted was 
13. Hearings on S. 2803, supra note II, at 200. 
14. Id. at 216. 
15. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 80. 
16. EDITED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS 185 (March 21, 1973), quoted ins. REP. No. 981, 
supra note 12, at 80. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 82; see also id. at 91-92. 
20. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 254 (1975). 
21. Petersen did not actually assume responsibility for the investigation until April 19, 1973. 
See id. Petersen testified, however, that he spoke with the President as late as April 18, S. REP. 
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used by the President and his advisers to formulate strategies in order 
to counter the investigation. 22 Further, Petersen apparently reached an 
agreement with White House officials early in the investigation that 
the scope of the inquiry would be limited to the initial burgl_ary, and 
would not extend into White House affairs. 23 The Senate Watergate 
Committee concluded that Petersen's conduct in the Watergate investiga-
tion "raises a question as to whether high Department of Justice of-
ficials can effectively administer criminal justice when White House 
personnel, or the President himself, are the subjects of the 
investigation. " 24 
The Watergate investigation underscored the need for a special pro-
secutor in a second and equally important manner by exposing the lack 
of accountability to the public, and to the rule of law, that existed 
within the Justice Department. It was apparent that the Justice Depart-
ment in the Nixon Administration had become politicized to the point 
of conspiring actively with the White House in abusing prosecutorial 
power to advance political ends. Press reports in 1973, for example, 
indicated that the FBI - a branch of the Justice Department - had 
received orders from the White House to carry out wiretaps on newsmen 
and government officials whose support of the President was suspect. 25 
No. 981, supra note 12, at 94, and conversations between the President and counsel for White 
House aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman strongly suggest that the President continued to confer 
with Petersen even after the 19th, EDITED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS 1239-40 (April 19, 1973), 
quoted in S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 94. 
22. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 80-82. 
23. Id. at 81. 
24. Id. at 80. On April 30, 1973, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst resigned. President 
Nixon nominated Elliot Richardson to take his place. During his confirmation hearings, Richardson 
agreed to appoint an independent special prosecutor to take responsibility for the Watergate 
investigation. On May 25, 1973, Archibald Cox was sworn in as Special Prosecutor and the 
Watergate Special Prosecution Force was officially established. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECU-
TION FORCE, REPORT 4-5, 254-55 (1975). With the creation of an independent prosecution force 
under Cox, the potential for collusion was greatly diminished. Yet in October of the same year, 
in the face of subpoenas by Cox for the release of tapes of Oval Office conversations, President 
Nixon ordered his subordinates to fire the special prosecutor. Attorney General Richardson resigned 
in protest, and Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus was fired when he too refused to carry 
out the order. Acting Attorney General Robert Bork finally did fire Cox. The events of the 
day were referred to by the press as the "Saturday Night Massacre." 
While public outrage over the Cox firing was partially assuaged by White House guarantees 
that the new special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, would not be removed without consent of a 
bipartisan coalition in the Congress, see Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legisla-
tion: Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93d. Cong., I st Sess. I 75 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) [hereinafter 
cited as Special Prosecutor Hearings fears persisted that the President had succeeded in replacing 
Cox with "his own man," see id., at 176 (remarks of Chesterfield Smith, President, ABA); 
see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1973, § I, at 40, col. I, quoted in Special Prosecutor Hearings, 
supra note 24, at 239. 
25. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 63-65 (1975). Testimony before the 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities subsequently showed these reports 
to be true. See S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 37-40. 
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Moreover, the Watergate Special Prosecutor Force investigated charges 
that during the spring of 1972 the Department of Justice, under the 
direction of John Mitchell, 26 settled three antitrust suits against the 
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) in return 
for ITT's help in financing the 1972 Republican National Convention. 21 
These charges resulted in the subsequent prosecution and conviction 
for perjury of then Assistant Attorney General Richard Kleindienst 
by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 28 Similarly, the Senate 
Watergate Committee heard testimony that White House staff members 
discussed the possibility of using the Justice Department's Antitrust 
Division to punish the three major networks. 29 Testimony further reveal-
ed that Robert Maridan, then Assistant Attorney General in charge 
of the Internal Security Division within Justice, forwarded extensive 
FBI investigative information to the White House and to the Commit-
tee to Re-Elect the President. 30 
These activities raised the question whether high Justice Department 
officials who themselves abused the law could be expected to hold their 
peers or their superiors accountable. Many in Congress felt that some 
outside check on the politicization of the Justice Department was needed 
in order to prevent official corruption on the part of the very officials 
whose duty it was to police and prosecute official corruption. As the 
Senate Report on the 1978 Ethics Act noted: "[Nixon Administration 
officials] made the ... assumption that 'their' Department of Justice 
would not investigate actions condoned and conducted by employees 
of the White House ... [T]he existence of the authority for the court 
to appoint a temporary special prosecutor would be a deterrent to such 
an attitude by high-level government officials." 31 
Thus, Watergate dramatically revealed the fragility of a system of 
government that relies on officials in positions of power to police 
themselves. It made clear that without some outside check on officials, 
it is possible for an unscrupulous President, with compliant subordinates 
in the Justice Department, to commit "serious crimes" against the 
government and the public at large. 32 
26. The politicized nature of the Justice Department was epitomized by Mitchell himself, 
who resigned as Attorney General in 1972 to head the Committee to Re-Elect the President. 
See Hearings on S. 2803, supra note 11, at 2-3 (remarks of Sen. Ervin). 
27. WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 57 (1975). 
28. Id. at 60. 
29. S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 145. 
30. Id. at 146. 
31. S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977). See generally supra note II. 
32. Whitney North Seymour, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
testified before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice that the damage that the White 
House had inflicted upon the government and the public could be sorted into six categories: 
(I) improper conduct during the 1972 re-election campaign; (2) improper communication be-
tween the White House and the federal bench; (3) improper use of executive clemency; (4) im-
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Finally, Watergate revealed that if public confidence in government 
was to be restored and maintained, remedying the actual conflict of 
interest in Justice Department prosecution of high officials was not 
enough; the appearance of impropriety and favoritism had to be re-
moved as well. The Senate Report on the Ethics Act concluded that, 
"The appearance of conflict is as dangerous to public confidence in 
the administration of justice as true conflict itself. Having men of in-
tegrity operate in the face of a conflict is an insufficient protection 
for a system of [j]ustice. " 33 One witness testifying in support of the 
special prosecutor law said, "We must not only do justice, but be able 
to assure the public that justice has been done." 34 
II. THE OPERATION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LAW 
A. The Statutory Mechanism 
As the Watergate scandal unfolded, the public reaction produced 
a clear mandate: practical legislative steps had to be taken to ensure 
that executive abuse of the public trust did not occur again. 35 Inspired 
by ''the greatest mass outpouring of public protest in our history,'' 36 
members of the House and Senate considered a variety of proposals 
designed to impose independent checks on the activities of high execu-
tive officials and to alleviate favoritism in the investigation of official 
misconduct. Committees in both houses considered proposals ranging 
from placing the Justice Department wholly outside the executive 
branch, 37 to establishing a permanent special prosecutor for all official 
misconduct. 38 
The solution finally adopted by Congress was to provide a mechanism 
--•--------- - ----------
proper use of federal investigative agencies; (5) -interference with the proper functioning of the 
Office of Attorney General; (6) misuse of national security powers. Special Prosecutor Hearings, 
supra note 24, at 193. 
33. S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 3 I, at 6. 
34. Id. at 6. 
35. The Senate Watergate Committee concluded that "unmonitored executive investigative 
and prosecutorial agencies may be reluctant to expose wrongdoing in the executive branch", 
S. REP. No. 981, supra note 12, at 96, and therefore submitted to the Senate as one of its final 
recommendations the creation of an independent Public Attorney's Office, analogous in some 
respects to a special prosecutor, "to investigate and prosecute where conflicts of interest in the 
executive branch exist." See id. at 96-100. Similarly, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 
in its Final Report, concluded that "No one who has watched 'Watergate' unfold can doubt 
that the Justice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting high officials, or that 
an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to politically neutral principles of fairness 
and justice." WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 137-38 (1975). 
36. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 24, at 153 (remarks of Rep. Moss). 
37. S. 2803, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess., (1973). 
38. S. 495, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., (1975). 
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for the appointment of temporary special prosecutors. 39 Although this 
mechanism is established as an ongoing feature of the law enforce-
ment authority of the federal government, 40 the office of any particular 
special prosecutor is of temporary duration. The office comes into being 
in order to investigate a discrete set of allegations of wrongdoing by 
an official, 41 and the office expires when that investigation and any 
concomitant prosecution is completed. 42 
The special prosecutor mechanism is triggered whenever the Attorney 
General "receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to 
investigate' ' 43 that any person within a class of high executive officials 
defined by statute44 has committed a violation of federal criminal law. 45 
The Attorney General then has discretion to conduct, for a period not 
to exceed ninety days, a preliminary investigation of the matter as he 
"deems appropriate. " 46 In determining whether grounds to investigate 
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-98 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). The 1982 amendments to the Ethics Act changed the term used by the Act from "special 
prosecutor" to "independent counsel." Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). The reason 
for the change, as explained in the Senate Report on the Amendments, was to diminish the 
pejorative Watergate connotations that attach to the term "special prosecutor": 
The Subcommittee believes, however, that much of the adverse publicity resulting from 
a special prosecutor investigation could be diminished by simply changing the name 
from "special prosecutor" to "independent counsel." This change would remove the 
Watergate connotation of a special prosecutor investigation and would help spare the 
subject of such an investigation adverse public reaction. Equally important, the name 
"independent counsel" more accurately indicates that the investigation is being handled 
outside of normal government channels by an impartial investigator. 
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 2. Notwithstanding this recent change in the Jaw, 
this Article will continue to use the term "special prosecutor" because it more accurately reflects 
the current public understanding of the office. 
40. The special prosecutor provisions however, as noted above, are subject to a five-year 
automatic termination provision. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 6. 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). 
42. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
44. The limited set of officials subject to the special prosecutor provisions includes only the 
President, Vice President, Cabinet officers, high officials in the White House, Justice Depart-
ment, the Internal Revenue Service and the Central Intelligence Agency, and ranking officers 
of the President's national campaign committee. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amend-
ed by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). This encompasses a total of approximately 
125 individuals. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 31. The 1982 amendments 
made minor changes to this list, narrowing somewhat the number of officials encompassed by 
the Act and shortening the period of time during which an official is covered after he leaves 
office. See Pub. L. No, 97-409, § 3, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). 
In addition, the Attorney General may seek appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate 
allegations of criminal wrongdoing by individuals other than those specified in the statute where 
the Attorney General determines that an investigation by him "may result in a personal, finan-
cial or political conflict of interest." 28 U.S.C. § 59l(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
45. The Act encompasses misdemeanors and felonies, but excludes petty offenses. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 59l(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
46. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 
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exist, the Attorney General may consider both the specificity of the 
information received and the credibility of the source of the informa-
tion. 47 If the Attorney General concludes after investigation that there 
are ''reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or pro-
secution is warranted, " 48 the matter must be referred to the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals for appointment of a special prosecutor. 49 
The Ethics Act establishes a three-judge panel of the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over matters con-
cerning the appointment and removal of the special prosecutor. 50 That 
2039 (1983). Upon a showing of "good cause," the special prosecutor division of the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals may grant the Attorney General a single 60-day extension of 
the time for the preliminary investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). 
47. 28 U .S.C. § 592(a)(I) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 
2039 (1983). This provision was added by the 1982 amendments. Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 4(b), 
96 Stat. 2039 (1983). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). If the Attorney General determines that no reasonable grounds for further investigation 
exist, he must notify the appropriate division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
and the matter ends. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(I) (Supp. IV 1980). 
This standard reflects a considerable broadening of the Attorney General's discretion accom-
plished by the 1982 amendments. As originally enacted, the Attorney General was required to 
begin a preliminary investigation whenever he received "specific information" that a covered 
official had violated the law. The original statute gave the Attorney General little or no discre-
tion to evaluate the weight or credibility of the allegation. Further, as originally enacted, the 
law required the Attorney General to yield to a special prosecutor whenever, after his preliminary 
investigation, he could not conclude that "the matter is so unsubstantiated as not to warrant 
further investigation or prosecution." 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(I) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 
§ 4(c), 96 Stat. 2039 (1983)). The new law, in contrast, allows the Attorney Generar to weigh 
the sufficiency of the evidence and decide if "reasonable grounds" exist for further investiga-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(I) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. i039 
(1983). 
These changes were made in response to criticism that the threshold triggering mechanism 
of the original law was too low, resulting in the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate 
alleged criminal violations which are rarely prosecuted by the Justice Department. See, e.g., Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Management of the Senate Comm. of Government 
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10 (1981) (testimony of Former Attorney General Benjamin 
Civiletti); id. at 58, 66 (testimony of Philip B. Heymann). The Senate Subcommittee that drafted 
the 1982 amendments concluded that the original threshold standard "result[ed] in an uneven 
administration of justice: one standard is applied to the citizenry at large, while another is ap-
plied to our public officials." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981 supra note 8, at 48. The Subcom-
mittee concluded that the appointment standard should be raised "[t]o lessen the inequities created 
by the present low standard and to prevent needless special prosecutor investigations." Ii at 
49. The Subcommittee stated that the higher standard would permit the Attorney General "to 
exercise limited discretion in evaluating the results of the preliminary investigation .... " Id. 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). In addition, the Act is triggered whenever a majority of either the majority or the non-
majority party members of the Judiciary Committees of either House of Congress requests in 
writing that the Attorney General seek appointment of a special prosecutor. 28 U.S.C. § 595(e) 
(Supp. IV 1980). The Attorney General must, after conducting a preliminary investigation of 
the matter, report back to the Committee in writing on his actions. Id. 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (Supp. IV 1980). The three judges are designated by the Chief Justice 
of the United States and sit on the panel in this division for a two year period. 28 U.S.C. § 
49(a), (d). 
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division of the court, upon referral of a matter by the Attorney General, 
is empowered to appoint a special prosecutor and to define the scope 
of the prosecutor's investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction. s1 
The powers of the special prosecutor, as well as several important 
accountability features, are set forth in the statute. The investigative 
powers include conducting grand jury proceedings, reviewing evidence 
received, inspecting tax returns, compelling testimony, determining 
whether to contest any privileges asserted by witnesses, and making 
application to the courts with respect to grants of immunity for 
witnesses. 52 The prosecutorial functions include framing and signing 
indictments, filing informations, initiating and conducting prosecutions 
and other necessary civil or criminal litigation, and determining whether 
to appeal adverse decisions. 53 The special prosecutor may hire staff 
to aid in performing the functions of the office, 54 and may seek the 
assistance of the Department of Justice on matters within the jurisdic-
tion of the investigation. ss 
Several controls on the power of the special prosecutor are also pro-
vided in the Act. First, the scope of the appointee's prosecutorial 
jurisdiction is circumscribed by court definition. 56 This definition in 
turn is based upon the initial report of the Attorney General as to 
matters which, in his belief, are substantiated sufficiently to warrant 
further investigation or prosecution. 57 The special prosecutor has no 
power to operate outside the scope of this limited jurisdiction or to 
extend it unilaterally. ss 
A second limitation on the activities of the special prosecutor lies 
in a provision of the Act that states: "A special prosecutor shall, ex-
cept where not possible, comply with the written policies of the Depart-
ment of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws." 59 This 
provision technically does allow the special prosecutor to deviate from 
established Justice Department guidelines. Yet the intent of Congress 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
53. Id. 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d) (Supp. IV 1980). The Justice Department is required by statute to 
provide any assistance requested by the special prosecutor. Id. 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
57. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
58. He may, however, request the Attorney General or the division of the court. to refer 
to him additional matters, but only if they are related to his original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 594(e) (Supp. JV 1980). The division of the court, upon the request of the Attorney General, 
may expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (Supp. JV 1980). 
59. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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is plainly that the special prosecutor should conform his discretion to 
established principles and follow normal Justice Department practices. 
As the Senate Report to the 1982 amendments stated, the intent of 
this provision ''is to create a presumption that the special prosecutor 
will follow prosecutorial guidelines. " 60 
The third element of accountability is the statutory requirement that 
the special prosecutor report to the appointing court on both the disposi-
tion of all cases brought and the reasons for not prosecuting any matter 
within the jurisdiction of the office. 61 The court then has the discretion 
to release that report to the Congress, the public, or to any appropriate 
person. 62 Further, the prosecutor must "from time to time" send to 
Congress statements or reports on his activities. 63 The special prosecutor 
must also cooperate with House and Senate committees exercising over-
sight jurisdiction. 64 
Finally, the statute provides that the special prosecutor may be re-
moved by the Attorney General for "good cause" or for any disabling 
condition which impairs the performance of his duties of office. 65 
However, if the prosecutor is removed, the Attorney General must report 
this promptly both to the court and to Congress. 66 Further, the special 
prosecutor may contest removal by bringing a civil action against the 
Attorney General. 67 That action is adjudicated before the division of 
the court which appointed the prosecutor, and that court may order 
the prosecutor's reinstatement or other appropriate relief. 68 
60. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 53; see also s. REP. No. 95-170, supra 
note 31, at 69-70. 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b) (Supp. IV 1980). 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 595(d) (Supp. IV 1980). 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 
2039 (1983). The "good cause" standard for removal was added by the 1982 amendments. Pub. 
L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). As originally enacted, the statute provided for removal 
of the special prosecutor for "extraordinary impropriety" or "any other condition that substan-
tially impairs ... performance." The Senate Report on the amendments notes that the original 
standard "may present too many opportunities for the special prosecutor to abuse his author-
ity." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 54. Notwithstanding this weakening of the 
law, however, the Subcommittee "stress[ed] that the Attorney General must use this removal 
power in only extreme, necessary cases, as removal of a special prosecutor severely undermines 
the public confidence in investigations of wrongdoing by public officials." Id. 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). 
67. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
68. Id. In addition to the changes described above, the 1982 amendments also provided that 
the court may award to the subject of a special prosecutor's investigation reimbursement for 
all or part of the attorney's fees incurred by that person during the investigation, provided no 
indictment is brought. Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 5, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 593(g) (Supp. 
IV 1980). The purpose of this addition is to compensate the subject of an investigation for the 
"extraordinary costs caused exclusively by this statute." SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 
8, at 27. 
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B. Experience Under the Statute 
To date, three special prosecutors have been appointed under the 
Act, and in each of the three cases, the prosecutor has concluded that 
no criminal charges should be brought against the subject of the in-
vestigation. The first appointment occurred after allegations were made 
that White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan was using cocaine 
in violation of federal law. 69 After a preliminary investigation required 
by the Act, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti on November 19, 1979, 
applied to the special prosecutor division of the District of Columbia 
Circuit for the appointment of a special prosecutor. 10 On November 
29, 1979, the court appointed Arthur H. Christy special prosecutor. 
After a six month investigation, Christy, on May 28, 1980, submitted 
a report to the court describing his investigation and stating his con-
clusion that the case against Jordan be closed. 11 
The second appointment of a special prosecutor grew directly out 
of the first. 12 In the report to the court on Hamilton Jordan, Christy 
filed a confidential memorandum, which was transmitted to Attorney 
General Civiletti, stating that allegations of drug possession had been 
made against Timothy Kraft, then campaign manager of the Carter-
Mondale Presidential Committee. 73 After a preliminary investigation, 
the Attorney General requested the court to appoint another special 
prosecutor. 74 On September 9, 1980, the court named Gerald Gall-
inghouse as special prosecutor. 7 5 Gallinghouse completed his criminal 
investigation in March 1981 and concluded that no charges should be 
69. The description of the special prosecutor's investigation into the Jordan matter is derived 
from a summary in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, 
supra note 8, at 12-14. The allegations against Jordan grew out of a federal investigation into 
alleged tax evasion by the owners of the Studio 54 discotheque in New York. After the two 
owners were indicted for tax evasion in June 1979, they alleged to the U.S. Attorney's office 
that Mr. Jordan had used cocaine at Studio 54 in June 1978. 
70. The Attorney General noted that he was unable, after a preliminary investigation, to 
conclude "that the matter is so unsubstantiated that no further investigation ... is warranted." 
28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(l) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 4, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983)). 
71. The information compiled by Special Prosecutor Christy during the six month investiga-
tion was submitted to a grand jury prior to the submission of the report to the court. On May 
21, 1980, the grand jury voted not to bring charges. 
72. The description of the special prosecutor's investigation into the Kraft matter is derived 
from a summary in the Senate Report on the 1982 amendments, SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, 
supra note 8, at 14-15. 
73. Mr. Kraft was also subject to the provisions of the Special Prosecutor Act in his capacity 
as former White House Appointments Secretary and former Assistant to the President for Per-
sonal and Political Coordination. See 28 U.S.C. § 59l(b) (Supp. IV 1980). 
74. The Attorney General made the request on August 26, 1980. 
75. During the course of Special Prosecutor Gallinghouse's investigation, Kraft filed a civil 
action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of the special prosecutor law and seeking to en-
join the investigation. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. dismissed March 24, 1981). 
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brought against Kraft. 76 
The third appointment of a special prosecutor occurred in December 
of 1981, when Leon Silverman was appointed by the court as special 
prosecutor to investigate bribery allegations made against Secretary of 
Labor Raymond Donovan. 77 Mr. Donovan himself called for the 
appointment of a special prosecutor in order to quell the public contro-
versy over the charges made against him. 78 After a six month investi-
gation, Mr. Silverman concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant the bringing of criminal charges against Mr. Donovan, and 
the investigation was closed. 79 
In addition to these three appointments of special prosecutors under 
the Act, there have been at least six cases in which the Attorney General 
has conducted a preliminary investigation after receiving information 
of criminal misconduct by an official covered by the Act. 80 In all of 
these cases the Attorney General concluded that the matter should be 
dropped without appointment of a special prosecutor. 81 Because of the 
Act's restrictions on public disclosure of such investigations, it is not 
known which officials were involved or what charges were made in 
these cases. 82 
In each of the instances described above, the appointment of a special 
prosecutor to investigate criminal charges against high-ranking officials 
has succeeded in assuring the public that a fair and impartial investiga-
tion has taken place. Even where no charges have been brought, the 
fact that exoneration came from an independent source rather than 
from the Attorney General has increased public credibility in the out-
come of the investigation. In commenting on the special prosecutor's 
76. Kraft's civil action against the special prosecutor accordingly became moot, and was dis-
missed by the court on March 24, 1981. Kraft v. Gallinghouse, Order of March 24, 1981. 
77. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1981, at Al, col. 2. 
78. Id. 
79. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1982, at Al, col. 6. 
80. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at 15-16. 
81. Id. 
82. The Act provides that if the Attorney General concludes, after a preliminary investiga-
tion, that there are no reasonable grounds to believe "further investigation or prosecution is 
warranted," he shall so notify the court and submit to the court a summary of his investigation. 
28 U .S.C. § 592(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The statute provides that this notification of a preliminary 
investigation shall not be made public without leave of court. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
The statute also provides that in cases where the Attorney General applies to the court for 
appointment of a special prosecutor, the application and supporting documents shall not be made 
public without leave of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 592(d)(2) (Supp. JV 1980). Upon appointment 
of a prosecutor, the statute provides that his identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction shall be made 
public "upon request of the Attorney General or upon a determination of the division of the 
court that disclosure of the identity and prosecutorial jurisdiction of such special prosecutor 
would be in the best interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. JV 1980). It is therefore 
possible, though unlikely, that there have been appointments of special prosecutors, other than 
the three described above, which have not been made public. In any case, the statute requires 
public disclosure of a special prosecutor's identity and jurisdiction when "any indictment is returned 
or any criminal information is filed." Id. 
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dismissal of allegations against Secretary Donovan, for instance, The 
New York Times noted, "Th[e] law protects the public by guarding 
against favoritism, and it can be a boon to officeholders by giving 
them credible clearance when they deserve it. Would anyone have be-
lieved the same exoneration if it had come from Mr. Donovan's Cabinet 
colleague, the Attorney General?" 83 Similarly, The Washington Post 
cautioned against repeal of the law, noting that the special prosecutor 
provision "has helped restore public confidence in the integrity of the 
federal government. " 84 The Senate Subcommittee that conducted a 
thorough review of the law's implementation concluded that the law 
is fundamentally sound, and stated, ''By establishing a mechanism to 
ensure impartial and thorough investigations of allegations against high-
ranking Executive branch officials, the Act guards against both actual 
and perceived conflicts of interest and assures the public that govern-
ment officials are not above the law." 85 Finally, The New York Times, 
on another occasion, invoked the use of a colloquialism to best sum 
up the strong policy reasons for continuing the special prosecutor 
mechanism. In an editorial, the Times wrote, ''Th[is] law protects of-
ficials and citizens alike from Government self-investigations that lack 
credibility and heighten public distress. You trust your mother, but 
you cut the cards. " 86 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Two broad constitutional challenges have been raised to the special 
prosecutor provisions. First, it is argued that the mechanism for ap-
pointment of the special prosecutor violates the appointments clause 
of the Constitution. 87 Proponents of this argument contend that the 
special prosecutor is not an "inferior officer" of the United States, 
that even if he is, he may not be appointed by a court of law, and 
that even if he may be appointed by a court, the special prosecutor 
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is not a "court 
of law" within the meaning of the appointments clause. The second 
constitutional challenge relies on broader principles of separation of 
powers, and claims that those considerations are a bar to the law's 
goal of providing for a prosecutor free from the influence of the Presi-
dent, even in those cases where the prosecutor is empowered to investi-
gate high aides or close associates of the President. According to this 
view, it is a constitutional requisite that even in such cases, the Presi-
83. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, at A22, col. I. 
84. Wash. Post, May 31, 1981, at 86, col. I. 
85. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1981, supra note 8, at I. 
86. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at A22, col. I. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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dent must control the initiation, direction, and termination of the 
prosecution. 
These attacks on the special prosecutor law invoke a rigid formalism 
that does justice neither to the legitimate concerns of Congress nor 
to the flexibility of the constitutional scheme. In fact, constitutional 
arrangements are not so unyielding as these arguments contend. The 
Supreme Court has expressly held that in matters involving the separa-
tion of powers, a "pragmatic, flexible approach" must control. 88 Such 
an approach validates both the mechanism in the Ethics Act for ap-
pointment of the special prosecutor, and the statutory independence 
which Congress has assured him in order that he may do his job. 
A. Appointments Clause Objections 
The Ethics Act provides that a division of the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit shall appoint the special prosecutor 
upon referral of information by the Attorney General. 89 The Congress, 
in establishing this mechanism, relied upon the language of the appoint-
ments clause of the Constitution, 90 which states: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments. 91 · 
Critics of the special prosecutor law have raised three objections under 
the appointments clause to the statutory mechanism for appointment 
of the special prosecutor. First, it is claimed that the special prosecutor 
is riot an "inferior officer" and thus can be appointed only upon· 
nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. 92 Second, 
the argument is made that, even if the special prosecutor is an "in-
88. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977). 
89. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. IV 1980). 
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
91. Id. (emphasis added). 
92. See Brief for Timothy Kraft at 11-12, Kraft v. Gallinghouse, No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. filed 
Nov. 19, 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRAFT BRIEF) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
For general background to the Kraft case, see supra notes 7, 75-76, 92. The constitutional claims 
made by Kraft are representative of those voiced by critics of the special prosecutor legislation. 
For this reason the Kraft brief is cited frequently throughout the remainder of this Article. 
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f erior officer," his appointment may not be vested by Congress 
anywhere outside the executive branch. 93 Third, it is argued that even 
if the special prosecutor's appointment may be vested in the "courts 
of law," the panel of judges here vested with the appointment power 
does not constitute such a "court. " 94 
1. The special prosecutor as inferior officer- Article II, section 
2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides for the appointment of certain 
principal officers by the President alone, with confirmation by the 
Senate, and the appointment of all other "inferior Officers" by the 
"Courts of Law," the "Heads of Departments," or the "President 
alone," as the Congress "think[s] proper. " 95 Thus, if the special pros-
ecutor is held to be a principal officer, a federal statute vesting ap-
pointment power in a division of the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
would be unconstitutional. 
On its face, the appointments clause limits principal officers to those 
enumerated: ambassadors, Supreme Court Justices, public ministers 
and consuls. The first two categories are self-explanatory. The present-
day meaning of the third category - ministers and consuls - is not 
so clear, but evidence indicates that these officers are no more than 
the heads of the various government departments and agencies. 96 
A special prosecutor clearly does not rise to this status. Although 
it is obvious that a special prosecutor is not the head of any depart-
ment in name, critics have nonetheless argued that he should be con-
sidered a principal "Officer of the United States" because he has the 
powers of a department head. As Kraft argued in his challenge to the 
law, "[the prosecutor] acquires the power and authority of the Attor-
ney General and he may, as he alone deems proper, create his own 
mini-Department of Justice. " 97 
In practice, however, this is an overstatement of the special pro-
secutor's power. To be sure, the authority and the independence he 
possesses are broad; however, it is broad authority in an extremely 
limited area. The prosecutor's duties and powers are statutorily limited 
to a specific jurisdiction defined by the appointing court. 98 Unlike the 
93. Id. at 8. 
94. Id. at 13. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
96. Time has clouded the understanding of the terms "public ministers and consuls." At 
the time the Constitution was drafted, a public minister was understood to be "a person ap-
pointed by the chief of state to act for him in a particular department of government; one en-
trusted with the administration of a department of state." 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 473 
(1961). In modern political terms, a "public minister" is the head of a department or agency. 
"Consul" was used to denote "an agent appointed and commissioned by a sovereign state to 
reside in a foreign town or port, to protect the interests of its traders and other subjects there, 
and to assist in all matters pertaining to the commercial relations between the two countries." 
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 884 (1961). 
97. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 5. 
98. 28 U.S.C. § 593 (Supp. IV 1980). Indeed, this jurisdiction is defined in the first instance 
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head of a department, who is free to pursue any matter within the 
broad confines of executive power, the special prosecutor is limited 
to the exercise of his power within a single, specific investigation. 99 
Even in that context, he must follow the guidelines of the Department 
of Justice, which are ultimately determined by the Attorney General. 100 
Moreover, the prosecutor is subject to oversight scrutiny by both the 
Court and Congress, to which he must report on his activities and 
judgments. 101 Finally, the special prosecutor is subject to removal by 
the Attorney General on any grounds which constitute "good cause. " 102 
In each of these respects, he is far more fettered than the Attorney 
General or any other department head. 
Because the special prosecutor does not exercise the power of a depart-
ment head or other officer enumerated in article II, he must be treated 
- for purposes of the appointments clause - as an inferior officer. 
This point is clear from the language of the clause itself, which leaves 
to the Congress the authority to create all other offices of the United 
States beyond Supreme Court Justice, ambassador, consul and minister. 
The clause then provides that ''Congress may by law, vest the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers ... in the President alone, in the courts 
of law, or in the heads of departments." 103 The language "such in-
ferior officers" clearly refers back to the holders of all the additional 
offices created by Congress; in other words, all officers other than 
Justice, ambassador, consul, or minister. 104 Thus, simply by constru-
ing the language of the clause, inferior officers are those who hold 
an office that is created by statute and that is below the rank of depart-
ment head. The special prosecutor falls within this large group. 
Judicial interpretation of the appointments clause supports this con-
struction. The Supreme Court first discussed the issue of the demarca-
tion between principal and inferior officers in United States v. 
Germaine. 105 There the question was whether a surgeon retained on 
an ad hoc basis by the Commissioner of Pensions was an officer of 
the United States or simply an employee. 106 Because the surgeon was 
on the basis of an investigation and report conducted by a department head, the Attorney General. 
28 U.S.C. § 593 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 35-68. 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
100. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 595 (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). 
102. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (Supp. IV 1980), as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 
(1983). 
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
104. Any other interpretation does injustice to the language of the provision, since it would 
leave the term "such" as surplus language, a result which cannot rationally be assumed. United 
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). 
105. 99 U.S. 508 (1878). 
106. That line of demarcation has been considered by the Court on several occasions. See 
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to serve only when summoned by the Commissioner of Pensions and 
was to be paid only on a fee-for-service basis, the Court found him 
to be an employee. 101 In the course of its opinion defining the line 
of demarcation between officers and employees, however, the Court 
stated that "[t]he Constitution ... divides its officers into two classes. 
The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirma-
tion by the Senate. But . . . in regard to officers inferior to those 
specially mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment 
... in the courts of law, or ... the heads of departments." 108 The 
Court thus took the position - consistent with the language of the 
appointments clause - that "inferior officers" are those ranking 
beneath the officers expressly enumerated in the Clause, or in terms 
relevant there, those beneath the heads of departments. 109 
Collins v. United States, 110 decided by the Court of Claims the year 
before the Germaine case, adds further weight to this view. In Collins, 
the issue was Congress's authority to delegate to the President alone 
the power to reappoint a major in the army. The Court of Claims 
found the delegation of authority for Collins's reinstatement to be in 
conformity with the appointments clause's provisions for inferior of-
ficers. In interpreting the phrase "inferior officers," the Court stated 
that ''the Constitution leaves it to Congress to vest in the President 
alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments the appointment 
of any officer inferior or subordinate to them . . . . " 111 Here, too, 
the court's conclusion is plainly that inferior officers are those rank-
ing below the enumerated ones. 112 
Critics of the special prosecutor law have cited Buckley v. Valeo 113 
for the proposition that the special prosecutor is not an ''inferior of-
ficer'' and therefore must be appointed by the President and confirmed 
also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (merchant appraiser was not an officer); 
United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 531 (1888) (customs clerk was not an officer). 
107. The Court noted that the duties exercised by the surgeon were "occasional and intermit-
tent." 99 U.S. at 512. While it is true th&t the special prosecutor under the Ethics Act is not 
a permanent prosecutor, see supra text accompanying notes 39-42, the magnitude and independence 
of his position makes it plain that he is more than a mere employee. 
108. 99 U.S. at 509-10 (emphasis added). 
109. Edwin Corwin, in his commentaries on the Constitution, agreed with this analysis, stating 
"[i)nferior officers' are evidently officers subordinate to the heads of departments or the courts 
of law .... " E. CORWIN. THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 145 (1973). 
110. 14 Ct. Cl. 568 (1878). 
111. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
112. Although the inference raised by language of the case is that the appointing authority 
must be vested in all instances in a superior official of the same branch, that point is clearly 
dispelled by Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 
912 (D.D.C. 1967). See also infra text accompanying notes 124-135. The actual holding of the 
Court of Claims - that inferior 'officers are all those officers below the rank of the enumerated 
officers - is borne out by the Supreme Court's views in the Germaine case. See supra text 
accompanying note 105. 
113. 424 U.S. l (1976). 
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by the Senate. 114 In Buckley, the issue was whether Congress could 
vest appointment of Federal Election Commissioners in the President 
(with the consent of the Senate and House), in the Speaker of the House, 
and the President pro tempore of the Senate. The Court held that none 
of these appointment methods for Commissioners was sanctioned by 
article II of the Constitution. 115 Because the Commissioners were found 
to exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States," the Court ruled that they were "officers" and thus must be 
appointed according to one of the several methods prescribed in the 
appointments clause. 116 
The Court in Buckley did not rule - nor did it have to rule -
on the question of whether the Commissioners ~ere principal or in-
ferior officers. The Court did not even address that question. Rather, 
in Buckley, the Court distinguished officers - both principal and in-
ferior - from those who are not officers.i 11 The Court in Buckley 
said only that the Federal Election Commissioners were officers - either 
principal or inferior - and thus had to be appointed according to 
one of the methods under article II, although it did not say which 
method. 
Thus, although Buckley supports the proposition that an appointee 
exercising "significant authority" is an officer rather than an employee 
of the United States - and hence the proposition that a special pros-
ecutor is an "officer" of the United States - it offers no support 
for the assertion that the special prosecutor is a principal officer and 
must therefore be appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. Buckley proves only that the special prosecutor is 
either a principal or an inferior officer of the United States, but not 
which. That question, the critical one, is answered by the appointments 
clause, both on its face and as interepreted by the Germaine and Collins 
cases. As an appointee ranking below a department head, and below 
a "consul" or "minister," the special prosecutor is an inferior officer 
of the United States. Congress, therefore, has the discretion, "as they 
think proper," to vest his appointment "in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 118 
2. Delegation to the courts under the appointments clause- Critics 
of the special prosecutor law maintain that even if the special pros-
ecutor is held to be an inferior officer, the appointments clause does 
not allow Congress to vest his selection in the courts. This argument 
114. See KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 11. 
115. 424 U.S. at 124-25, citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.?-
116. 424 U.S. at 125-26, citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878). 
117. In Buckley, the Court drew a line similar to the one it had previously drawn in Ger-
maine. In Germaine, officers were differentiated from employees, while in Buckley they were 
distinguished from legislative functionaries. 
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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is based not on the language of the clause - for the language expressly 
allows Congress to vest the appointment in the courts - but rather 
arises by implication based on principles of separation of powers. 
Specifically, it is contended that if Congress is permitted to vest ap-
pointment of the special prosecutor in the judiciary, there is nothing 
to prevent an "emasculation [of] the separation of powers between 
the three branches of government by requiring, for example, 'Inferior' 
judicial officers to be appointed by heads of executive departments 
and 'Inferior' executive officers to be appointed by the Judiciary." 119 
As an initial matter, any attempt to impose substantial restrictions 
on Congress's discretion here should be viewed with disfavor. By the 
language of the clause, Congress is accorded wide latitude in deter-
mining where to vest the power to appoint inferior officers. Three 
options are set out - the President, the courts of law, or the heads 
of departments. Congress may choose among the three "as they think 
proper:" 120 Justice Story, in his commentaries on the Constitution, 
remarked on the scope of this discretion: "[i]f any discretion should 
be allowed, its limits could hardly admit of being exactly defined; and 
it might fairly be left to congress to act according to the lights of ex-
perience. It is difficult to foresee ... all the combinations of circum-
stances, which might vary the right to appoint. ... " 121 
I 19. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 12. See also Hearings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10937 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 343-49 (1973) (Statement of Robert C. Cramton, Dean, Cornell Law School) 
hereinafter cited as Cramton Hearings. Dean Cramton argues that the "inferior officers" clause 
was designed "to allow the appointment of subordinate officials of particular branches of the 
government to be placed in the heads of those branches" and that "it is apparent that one branch 
cannot be given the sole appointive authority of important officials of another branch." Id. 
at 344, citing Ex Porte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839). 
120. The last clause of the provision says that Congress "may" vest the appointment of 
inferior officers in the President, the courts, or the heads of departments. Thus Congress has 
a fourth alternative available - to require that particular inferior officers be appointed in the 
same manner as principal officers, i.e., nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
Congress has chosen that method for many inferior officers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
121. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 394-98 (3d 
ed. 1858). The broad discretion given to Congress by the "inferior officer" provision is sup-
ported by the history of the appointments clause. As originally proposed, the clause vested in 
the President alone the power to appoint all officers not provided for in the Constitution. 1 
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 226, 230, 236 (1934) 
(Virginia Plan), 244 (New Jersey Plan), 63, 67 (Committee of the Whole, June I, 1787), 22, 
33, 117, 121, 132, 141 (Convention, July 17 and 26, 1787). This delegation of unlimited authority 
to the President met with strong objection. A subsequent draft recommended that Senate confir-
mation be required for all officers of the United States unless otherwise provided in the Con-
stitution. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 499 (1934). 
Changes were made to ensure that the President could make no appointment to an office which 
was not created either by the Constitution or by Congress. Id. at 405, 621. The "inferior of-
ficers" provision itself reflects the tension between the executive and legislative branches. Id. 
at 627-28. Although Congress may not vest the power to appoint inferior officers within itself, 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 127 (1976), it nonetheless retains authority to select the appointing 
body from among the President, the heads of departments, and the courts of law. 
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There is no case support for the contrary contention that an inferior 
officer can be appointed only by the head of the branch of govern-
ment in which he is to serve. Indeed, there is no case holding invalid 
any appointing power vested by Congress in the courts. On numerous 
occasions the Court has expressly upheld such delegations, both when 
the appointed officer is directly concerned with the court administra-
tion of justice122 as well as when he is not. 123 
More explicit guidance for determining the proper scope of Con-
gress's discretion under the appointments clause has been offered by 
the Supreme Court. In Ex Parle Siebold, 124 the Court established a 
"congruity" or "propriety" test to govern the delegation to the judiciary 
of the power to appoint election supervisers. The Court held that Con-
gress may freely exercise its constitutional discretion to vest the power 
of appointment so long as there is no "incongruity" to its choice. 125 
The Court noted that "[i]t is ... usual and proper to vest the appoint-
ment of inferior officers in that department of the government . . . 
to which the duties of such officers appertain. But there is no absolute 
requirement ... in the Constitution ... [T]he selection of the appointing 
power . . . rests in the discretion of Congress." 126 
Since Siebold, it has been squarely held that Congress may vest the 
power to appoint prosecutors in the courts. In United States v. 
122. See Ex Parle Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (clerks of the District Courts); Birch 
v. Steele, 165 F. 577 (5th Cir. 1908) (referees in bankruptcy). 
123. See Ex Parle Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (supervisors of elections); Rice v. Ames, 
180 U.S. 371 (1901); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (United States 
Commissioners); United States v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (United States 
Attorneys); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (District of Columbia school 
board members). In all these cases, the courts rejected extreme limitations on Congress's discre-
tion in vesting the power of appointment of inferior officers. 
Moreover, in recent years, decisions concerning the general discretionary powers of federal 
prosecutors have not read those powers so expansively as to preclude the possibility of court 
appointment. See United States v. Crook, Crim. No. 151-72 (D.D.C., Oct. 27, 1972) (order deny-
ing motion to dismiss perjury charges); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. 
Morton, Civ. No. 1960 (D. Me., filed June 2, 1972) cited in Note, The Special Prosecutor in 
the Federal System: A Proposal, II AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 597 (1973). Similarly, there is 
considerable precedent among the state courts for vesting the appointment of a special prosecutor 
in the judicial branch in cases where the conflict of interest falls within the protected area of 
"'improper or corrupt motivation.'" See id. at 586, (quoting People v. Municipal Court, 7 
Cal. 3d 645, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1972)). 
124. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
125. Id. at 398. 
126. Id. at 397-98. The Court added: 
[T)he duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a constitutional 
duty of the courts; and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty 
required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void. 
It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of the officers in question could, with any 
greater propriety, and certainly not with equal regard to convenience, have been assigned 
to any other depository of official power capable of exercising it. Neither the President, 
nor any head of department, could have been equally competent to the task. 
Id. at 398. 
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Solomon, 121 the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute empower-
ing the courts to appoint U.S. Attorneys when vacancies occur. 128 The 
court there relied upon Siebold in concluding that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, "never rigidly engrafted upon the Constitution," must 
be "subordinated to the particular provisions [of article II] as to methods 
of appointment." 129 Similarly, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 130 the Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to vest the 
courts with the power to appoint United States Commissioners. Among 
the duties of the Commissioners was the power "to institute prosecu-
tions under laws relating to the elective franchise ... " 131 Despite 
the fact that these officers exercised· prosecutorial power, the Court 
upheld judicial appointment under the "inferior officers" provision 
of the appointments clause. 132 
Applying the Siebold test of "congruity" to the special prosecutor 
question, it is clear there is nothing incongruous about vesting a court 
with power to appoint an independent prosecutor. As in Siebold, "[i]t 
cannot be affirmed that the appointment ... [of the special prosecutor] 
could, with any greater propriety ... have been assigned to any other 
depository of official power capable of exercising it." 133 A prosecutor, 
unlike a general or a diplomat, is an officer of the court, a counsel 
to the grand jury, and as such, is subject to the disciplinary power 
of the court. 134 Courts are certainly familiar with the qualities that make 
a good prosecutor; indeed, courts habitually exercise a similar kind 
of judgment in appointing lawyers to represent indigent parties in 
criminal proceedings. 1 3 5 
127. 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N. Y. 1963). 
128. Id. at 843. See 28 U.S.C. § 546 (Supp. IV 1980). 
129. 216 F. Supp. at 840-41. The appropriateness of vesting appointment of the special pros-
ecutor in the courts may rest on even firmer footing than court appointment of temporary United 
States Attorneys as upheld in Solomon. The U.S. Attorney appointed by the courts, although 
his tenure may be terminated once the President and Senate agree to a permanent replacement, 
assumes all of the powers of the prosecutorial office, regardless of subject matter. The special 
prosecutor, in contrast, has jurisdiction over only a limited subject matter which is defined by 
the appointing court. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (Supp. IV 1980). See also United States v. Mitchell, 
136 F. 896 (C.C.D. Or.) (upholding judicial appointment of U.S. Attorney) writ of error dismissed, 
199 U.S. 616 (1905). 
130. 282 U.S. 344, 352 n.l, 353 (1931). 
131. Id. at 353 n.2. 
132. Id. at 352-53. See also Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901) (upholding the constitution-
ality of judicial appointment of commissioners). 
133. Ex Porte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879) (emphasis added). 
134. See United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 704 (W.D. La. 1949); Charge to the 
Grand Jury, 12 F.R.D. 495, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 
135. See generally Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 
(1979) (courts have discretion to appoint counsel in a criminal case where circumstances indicate 
accused is impoverished); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 877 (1961) (courts have discretion to determine if appointed attorney has rendered effective 
assistance to his client). 
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Nevertheless, objections persist that because the special prosecutor 
is engaged in the enforcement of federal criminal laws, it is more ap-
propriate to vest appointment in the executive. 136 In addition, critics 
argue that ''the appointment of a special prosecutor would impose an 
incongruous duty upon courts because of the danger that it would tarnish 
the neutrality of the judiciary and assign it prosecutorial duties." 137 
Yet "incongruity" would result not from the law as it now stands, 
but rather from any contrary arrangement in the executive branch. It 
plainly would be "incongruous" for the Attorney General to appoint 
a special prosecutor charged with investigating and prosecuting the Presi-
dent or his close associates. It is precisely in those instances that the 
Attorney General has the clearest conflict of interest, and that the in-
tegrity and independence of his prosecutorial power are most called 
into question. Indeed, the episodes of collusion between the Justice 
Department and the White House during Watergate conclusively 
demonstrated the impropriety of entrusting the investigation of high 
executive officials to high officials in the executive branch. 138 As Arch-
ibald Cox testified before the Senate: "the incongruity is in the top 
of the executive branch investigating itself." 139 
Thus, to read the Constitution as requiring the Attorney General 
to appoint special prosecutors not only def eats the essential point of 
the Ethics Act, but inevitably results in the very incongruity and il-
logic that the appointments clause seeks to avoid. In short, the Con-
stitution grants Congress broad discretion in vesting the power to ap-
point inferior officers. In the case of special prosecutors, Congress has 
exercised that discretion with wisdom, with logic, and with clear 
congruity. 140 
136. See Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a Constitu-
tional Justification, 87 YALE L.J. 1692, 1698 n.28 (1978). Some opponents of court appoint-
ment argue that "a most appropriate" test, first suggested in Ex Porte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 
Pet.) 230, 258 (1839), should be applied, rather than the "congruity" test of Ex Porte Siebold, 
100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879). Cramton Hearings, supra note 119, at 350. See also A. Bickel, On 
the Special Prosecutor, YALE L. REP .. Winter 1974, at 24; Baker, The Proposed Judicially Ap-
pointed Independent Office of Public Attorney: Some Constitutional Objections and an Alter-
native, 29 Sw. L.J. 671, 675 (1975). See generally 1981 Hearings, supra note 5, at 92-132 
(testimony of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice); Kramer, 
Smith, The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals for 1983 66 MINN. L. REV. 963 (1982). 
137. See Note, supra note 136, at 1699 n.28, citing Baker, supra note 136. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 9-34. 
139. Special Prosecutor Hearings, supra note 24, at 315-316 (remarks of Archibald Cox). 
140. A number of constitutional scholars have concluded that Congress may vest the courts 
with the power to appoint special prosecutors. Professor Tribe, in his treatise, directly addressed 
this question and dismissed any objections: "[A] special judicial commission could properly be 
created and charged with the duty of selecting an independent agent for the investigation and 
prosecution of illegal acts by the President or the President's subordinates." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 n.4 (1978). Other scholars agree. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 14476, 
supra note 11, at 162 (testimony of Archibald Cox); Hearings on Special Prosecutor (1973), 
supra note II, at 341 (testimony of Prof. Paul Freund); id. at 319 (testimony of Prof. Philip 
Kurland). 
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3. The special prosecutor division as a court of law- Critics of 
the special prosecutor law proffer one final argument with respect to 
the constitutionality of the appointment of special prosecutors. The 
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals charged by statute 
to appoint special prosecutors is not, it is argued, a "court of law" 
within the meaning of the appointments clause. 141 Rather, it is claimed 
that the three judge division 142 is an ad hoc group of judges gathered 
together solely to appoint an executive official. Insofar as the panel 
does not adjudicate cases and controversies, critics contend, it is not 
a court of law. 143 
This argument, however, is premised upon a misunderstanding of 
the law. The Ethics Act expressly provides that if the Attorney General 
for any reason removes the special prosecutor from office, the pros-
ecutor "may obtain judicial review of the removal in a civil action 
commenced before the division of the court and, if such removal was 
based on error of law or fact, may obtain reinstatement or other ap-
propriate relief." 144 The statute further provides that the court shall 
cause such an action to be in every way expedited. 145 
Thus, the special prosecutor division of the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals does adjudicate cases. Congress has great discretion 
to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, or divisions thereof, 
as it sees fit. 146 Therefore, the fact that Congress limited the article 
Ill jurisdiction of a division of the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
to but one type of controversy - dismissal of special prosecutors -
is of no import in determining whether or not that division is a "court." 
The division will be held to be a court if it is established by Congress 
pursuant to its power under article III, if it adjudicates "cases or con-
troversies" under article III, and if its judges enjoy article III protec-
tions.147 Because these conditions plainly apply to the special prosecutor 
division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, this division 
of the Circuit Court is in every sense a constitutional court, albeit one 
with a narrow jurisdiction. As a "court of law" established pursuant 
141. KRATT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 13-14. 
142. The three judge division is required by 28 U.S.C. § 49. See supra notes 50-51 and ac-
companying text. 
143. See KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 13-14; Hearings on S. 495 and S. 2036 before the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 264-269 (1975) (statement 
of Philip A. Lacovara, former Counsel to the Watergate Special Prosecutor). For general discus-
sion of the "case and controversy" requirement with respect to Article III courts, see P. BATOR, 
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL. SYSTEM 64-214 (2d ed. 1973). [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. 
144. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). 
145. Id. 
146. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 
(1962); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 
143, at 309-365. 
147. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962). 
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to article III, the division may, when so designated by Congress, exer-
cise the appointment powers granted to the courts of law by article II. 
B. Separation of Powers Objections 
Apart from challenging the constitutionality of the statutory 
mechanism for appointing the special prosecutor,l 48 critics have raised 
a second, broader claim of unconstitutionality - also based on the 
separation of powers doctrine - regarding the degree to which the 
Ethics Act insulates the prosecutor from the President's control. 
Specifically, opponents of the law contend that the prosecutorial power 
belongs solely to the executive branch, and "neither Congress nor the 
courts can interfere with it in any particular." 149 Thus, it is argued, 
insofar as the Ethics Act restricts the executive's power to remove the 
special prosecutor, 1 so and makes the special prosecutor directly account-
able to a court of law rather than the attorney general, the Act violates 
principles of separation of powers. 
The powers possessed by the federal government are divided and 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 119-140. 
149. KRAFT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 9. See also /981 Hearings, supra note S. Proponents 
of this position rely heavily on United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 935 (1965), which, they argue, held expressly that prosecutorial power belongs solely to 
the executive branch. Yet this characterization of the Cox case is erroneous. The issue before 
the en bane Fifth Circuit in Cox was whether a United States Attorney could be held in contempt 
for failing to comply with a court order directing him to prepare and to sign particular indict-
ments. That case did not involve the appointment of a prosecutor by the courts, but a directive 
from the court that the prosecutor perform his duties in a particular manner. Further, a majority 
of the Cox court expressly ruled that the court could order the prosecutor to draft a particular 
indictment, 342 F.2d at 181. Finally, although the Cox court did rule that the court could not 
compel the prosecutor to sign the indictment, the judge whose concurrence provided a majority 
on that issue based his ruling on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, i.e., the unlimited 
discretion of the prosecutor under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss indict-
ments once issued. 342 F.2d at 182 (Brown, J., concurring). See generally Note, supra note 136, 
at 1695 (reasoning of Cox is unpersuasive and should no longer be followed). For additional 
criticism of those relying on Cox, see infra text accompanying notes 167-176. 
150. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. The argument made here is that restrict-
ing the executive's removal power interferes with the proper functioning of the executive branch. 
Proponents of this position rely on Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), (statute limiting 
President's power to remove postmasters held unconstitutional). Yet recent cases have limited 
the Myers holding. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (the 
President cannot remove a member of a quasi-judicial or quasi-administrative independent 
regulatory agency in violation of federal statutory restrictions); Wiener v. United States, 357 
U.S. 349 (1958) (President denied the right to remove a War Claims Commission appointee, 
despite the absence of express congressional restriction on removal, because the Commissioner's 
task required freedom from executive interference); Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250 (1981) 
(President cannot remove at will officers of the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Com-
mission). For general discussion of the president's removal power, see E. CORWIN. THE PRESI-
DENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 56-58 (1927); Cross, The Removal Power 
of the President and the Test of Responsibility, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 81 (1954). Cf. infra text ac-
companying notes 172-75. 
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allocated among the three co-equal branches of government. 151 It has 
never been entirely clear, however, just how independent the Found-
ing Fathers intended the branches of government to be. Primarily two 
schools of thought have shaped analysis under the separation of powers 
doctrine. 152 James Wilson, one of the Framers of the Constitution, 
is frequently .associated with the rigid "isolationist position." 153 Wilson 
argued that the independence of each branch requires that it "should 
be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect, of either of 
the other two powers." 154 In contrast, James Madison was the leading 
proponent of a less rigid approach. 155 Madison argued that, at bot-
tom, the separation of powers doctrine is intended to prevent the un-
due accumulation of power in one branch of government to the detri-
ment of the others, thus disrupting the delicate checks and balances 
of the constitutional scheme. Madison described this principle well in 
the Federalist Papers, 156 where he defended the degree to which the 
Constitution blends the powers of the three branches. In his view it 
was only "[w]here the whole power of one department is exercised 
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another depart-
ment, [that] the fundamental principles of a free constitution are 
subverted.'' 157 
Over time, the Madisonian view has come to predominate. 158 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that a rigid interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine is ''inconsistent with the origins of that doc-
trine, recent decisions of the Court, and the contemporary realities of 
our political system." 159 The Court has concluded that "a hermetic 
sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another 
would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing 
itself effectively." 160 According to Justice Jackson's classic formula-
tion, the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but inter-
dependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 161 This "more pragmatic, flex-
151. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 
295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935). 
152. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 100 (1971). See generally M. VILE, CON-
STITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967). 
153. See generally]. ANDREWS, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (1896). 
154. Id. at 367. 
155. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison); R. NEUSfADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960). 
See also Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "the Separation of Powers", 2 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 385 (1934). 
156. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, No. 48 (J. Madison). 
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 325-26 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed.) (emphasis in original). 
158. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). 
159. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977). 
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 121 (1976). 
161. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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ible approach" to separation of powers adopted by the Court is set 
forth in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 162 and Buckley 
v. Valeo. 163 In these recent cases, the Court urged that resolution of 
separation of powers questions must ''be fixed according to common 
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination." 164 
Insofar as the central purpose of the separation of powers doctrine 
is to "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one 
branch at the expense of the other," 165 the doctrine is breached only 
when the act of one branch prevents another branch ''from accomplish-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions." 166 
Such usurpation does not result from the Ethics Act. The special 
prosecutor law does not pose any threat to the executive branch and 
does not diminish the "separateness" ~f that branch's powers. The 
law does not take the power of criminal prosecution away from the 
executive branch and lodge it in another; it turns neither legislators 
nor judges into prosecutors. 161 Rather, in a narrow category of cases, 
the law merely insulates the prosecutorial power within the executive 
branch from the threat of real or apparent improper influence and 
conflict of interest. Moreover, it is illogical to argue that the statutory 
delegation of authority to a special prosecutor usurps executive 
functions. 168 The Supreme Court has recognized not only that a special 
162. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
163. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
164. Id. at 122, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122. 
166. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. 
167. Notwithstanding appointment of the special prosecutor by the courts, the law clearly· 
does not turn the courts into prosecutors. The division of the District of Columbia Circuit em-
powered to appoint special prosecutors may define the prosecutor's jurisdiction, but has no con-
trol over the investigatory actions or prosecutorial decisions made by the prosecutor. The court 
has no more - or no less - control over the special prosecutor than any court has over any 
United States Attorney or other prosecutor. The Ethics Act thus respects the important distinc-
tion between appointment to, and actual administration of, an office, vesting appointment in 
the courts but reserving administration for the prosecutor. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 
398 (contrasting actual judicial administration of federal pension claims with mere judicial ap-
pointment of inferior executive branch officers); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 913 (1967) 
(contrasting judicial administration of schools with judicial appointment of school board members). 
168. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 (1978) ("Thus the Executive Branch 
is not an indivisible entity with a single head even for prosecutorial purposes; even the core 
executive mission of enforcing federal law be internally fragmented pursuant to congressional 
delegations and executive subdelegations."). More recently, the Court found that Congress could 
limit presidential control over members of the Federal Election Commission, an agency exercis-
ing, inter a/ia, civil law enforcement functions of the kind "usually performed by ... some 
department in the Executive Branch .... " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976). The Court 
said, "[T]he President may not insist that such functions be delegated to an appointee of his 
who is removable at will." Id. In that case, as here, there were strong policy reasons favoring 
insulation of the law enforcement agency from close presidential supervision. Cf discussion of 
United States v. Cox supra note 149, and discussion of removal power supra note 150. See also 
supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussion of state court encroachment on prosecutorial 
discretion). 
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prosecutor may operate and perform prosecutorial functions indepen-
dently of the President if authorized by law, 169 but that even when 
fully independent of the President's control, the special prosecutor is 
nonetheless a member of the executive branch, performing an executive 
function. 110 
Indeed, the law furthers rather than impedes the functioning of the 
executive branch in its duty faithfully to enforce the law. By ensuring 
that the executive branch is able to enforce the law fairly in precisely 
those cases where fairness is threatened by conflict of interest, the law 
is fully consistent with the goals and functions of the executive branch. 
The special prosecutor law guarantees the independence of the investi-
gation and prosecution of high executive officials and ensures that 
prosecutorial decisions will be made on the basis of merit rather than 
partiality or favoritism. Moreover, the law instills public confidence 
in those prosecutorial decisions which, if made by the Attorney General, 
might be met with skepticism and mistrust. 171 
Finally, even if the operation of the special prosecutor law divests 
the President of some control over what traditionally have been execu-
tive functions, the law is not inconsistent with the constitutional stan-
dard governing separation of powers set forth in Nixon and Buckley. 
"Common sense and the inherent necessities of . . . governmental 
coordination" 172 plainly support the constitutionality of the special pros-
ecutor law. To say that the President, as head of the executive branch, 
is charged with controlling the government's prosecutorial functions 
does not, as a constitutional principle, rigidly require the President 
to control the prosecution of his own wrojlgdoings or those of his close 
associates. Such inflexible thinking is precisely what the Supreme Court 
has cautioned against in this area. 173 To permit the President to ap-
point or remove 114 a special prosecutor where high officials in the ex-
ecutive branch have been implicated in illegal activities would risk trig-
gering the same loss of public faith in the national government that 
169. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 (1974). 
170. Id. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 19-34. 
One commentator has argued that the most important of the special prosecutor's functions 
constitutionally "need not be carried out under executive control." See Note, supra note I 36, 
at 1698-99. At the core of this claim is the contention that the prosecutor's activities can be 
divided into '"executive' and 'investigative' functions." Id. Prosecutorial functions generally 
held under executive control include "decisions to go forward with prosecution," the granting 
of witness immunity, and plea bargaining. Id. The investigative functions of the prosecutor, 
on the other hand, are firmly rooted in the grand jury - traditionally an independent body. 
Id. at 1700-01. Thus, insofar as the special prosecutor's primary function is to investigate the 
executive, control over his activities should be kept independent of the executive branch. 
172. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122, quoting Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
406 (1928). 
173. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. 
174. See discussion of removal power supra note 150. 
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crippled the country during the Watergate scandal. 175 Surely the "func-
tional" view of the separation of powers established by the Nixon Court 
is designed to allow the "mixing" of the branches of government in 
precisely this type of situation where the potential for abuse of power 
threatens the proper operation of government. 176 
In sum, the principal error made by critics of the special prosecutor 
law is their attempt to transform separation of powers as a general 
approach to the structure of government into a rigid rule of absolute 
application. The necessary corollary of this position is that the Presi-
dent must retain the power to oversee and control the government's 
prosecution in all cases, even if that prosecution is directed against 
himself, his friends, or. his close associates. In fact, the separation of 
powers doctrine is not so inflexible. The Constitution does not compel 
such a plainly illogical result. 177 
CONCLUSION 
The special prosecutor law is, fundamentally, a pragmatic law. It 
is addressed to real experiences, not hypothetical fears. It evolved directly 
out of a prolonged national scandal that exposed the full potential for 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 9-34. 
Critics have argued that, accepting the need for the law and its constitutionality, the special 
prosecutor provisions are "an odd solution to the 'problem'" because "if the Attorney General 
wishes to thwart the due administration of justice, he may easily do so ... by finding the matter 
'unsubstantial' after his preliminary investigation." KRATT BRIEF, supra note 92, at 15. This argu-
ment, however, is flawed in two respects. First, as a general matter, allegations of wrongdoing 
by high executive officials are likely to attract extensive press coverage. This close scrutiny by 
the national press acts as an effective check on any attempt by an Attorney General to avoid 
appointing a special prosecutor. Second, the Attorney General must have some means of weeding 
out frivolous allegations. Indeed, those now criticizing the law used this argument to push for 
the inclusion of an even more flexible "triggering" mechanism than in the original version of 
the law. See generally 1981 Hearings, supra note 5. 
176. See generally Nixon, 433 U.S. 125 (1980); Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings and Separa-
tions of Functions: the Case of the Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U. DET. L.J. 82, 84-86, 
89 (1960) (mixing of branches of government is permissible where abuse of power prevented). 
Indeed, state courts have long recognized that where one branch has fallen short of public expec-
tations or has failed to remain accountable to both the public and the law, it may be necessary 
for another branch to provide a remedy. See Note, supra note 123, at 584-86. In one sense 
the special prosecutor law merely codifies this well-accepted view of the separation of powers: 
it identifies a situation that practical experience has taught will always present a fundamental 
conflict of interest for members of one branch, and then enlists the aid of another branch to 
vitiate that threat, as a matter of law. 
177. As one distinguished lawyer stated in a letter to the Senate Committee considering the 
original law, "One cannot read the Constitution as forcing us to tolerate conflicts of interest 
on the part of the President, the Attorney General, and their immediate assistants that we can-
not, and do not; tolerate in mere judges and lawyers." Watergate Reorganization and Reform 
Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 & S. 2036 Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 
94th Cong., !st Sess. 206, 212 (copy of speech by Lloyd N. Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 
Washington, D.C., enclosed with letter of March 13, 1975, from Cutler to Senators Ribicoff 
and _Percy). 
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corruption and conflict of interest in those very executive branch of-
ficials whose primary duty is to enforce the law. As a pragmatic response 
to a constitutional crisis, the law must be viewed with an eye toward 
its purposes and its justifications. In furthering, not usurping, the ability 
of the executive branch to enforce the law fully and fairly, the Ethics 
Act's guarantees of independence for the special prosecutor are wholly 
consistent with both the language of the Constitution and a govern-
mental scheme of mutually interdependent branches. 
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